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AhNNESOTA LAW REVIE V

THE RATIONALE OF THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIESI

T

By EvERE T Fnsn*

HERE !have been two schools of thought as to the nature oi
the common law rule against perpetuities. One school has
argued that the object of the rule is to prevent too long postponement of the power of alienation of property by the crearitbn
of future interests therein; that the rule is satisfied by .e existence of personswho can jointly convey an absolute lee in the
property; and that the law has no objection to unvestfd interests
as such, but only in so'far as they postpone this power of alienation; that *his was particularly the nature of the rlet originally
even if it may have taken a new bent in its later development.'
The other school has maintained that the rule is aimed at too
long postponement of vesting, that remotely unvested interests are
per se obnoxious to the law, that although a power of aliemvtion
by the joint action of persons having interests is often promoted
by the vesting of these interests, that is not the main object of the
rule but only an incidental result, and that the law requires a not
*,Dean of the Law School,. University of Minnesota.
'The Minnesota rule against perpetuities Is: "Every future estate is
void in its creation, which sus ends 'the absolute power of alienation for
a longer period than is prescribed in this chapter; such power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons' m being by whom an abso-

lute fee in possession can be conveyed," General Statutes 1913, sec. 6664.

This rule was taken from the Revised Statutes of New York which were
enacted in 1828 Part a, chapter i,sec. 14. It has been since debated
whether the New York revisers intended to adopt the common law rule
or to make a new rule, and, indeed, it has been a matter of dispute what

the common law rule was. See, for example Fowler's Real Property

Law in New York, 3d Ed., p. 261 et seq.; Chaplin, Suspension of the
Power of Alienation, 2d Ed., p. 177 et seq.; Reeves, Real Property, p.
1261 et seq. The late decisions in New York seem to establish a rule
against remoteness in vesting, at least in certain cases, in addition to the
rule stated here. See 'Matter of Wilcox, (zog) 194 N. Y. *88, 8y N. F..
497; Walker v. Marcellus & Otisco Lake Ry. Co., (ig) 226 N. Y. 347,
j3

N. E 736. This brief study of the common law rule is here pre-

sented as preliminary to a further consideration of the Minnesota statwtory rule and its operation.
I Fowler's Real Property Law, 3d Ed., *6i; Reever, Real Pyroperty,
16:;

Fox, The Criticism of Cases, 6 Harv. L. Rev. :95.
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too' remote vesting even when such vesting is Amnecessary to, or
does not promote, this power of alienation of the property'
Each side has apparently been able to find support in the c' er
and dicta of the courts, and has dubbed .,-authorities of the Othrb
side "misfits," wrongly decided.' The first formulation of the
rule leaves more misfits than the second. But there are authorities which do not conform to the second formula. The language
of the cases has pretty consistently been th.-t the rule is against
suspension of the power of alienation."
There is another possible view of the nature of the rule. The
rule is ahtied at the practical suspension of the power of alienation
which resuli3 from postponing ownership of the property.. It requires that thee be a tcr.ant (or co-tenants) with power to alien
the property by reason of his ownership. It is not satisfied with a
power of alienation by joint action of all parties with interests,
yet it does not require vesting where vesting does not at all promnote this power of alienation. t
The policy and history of the law, the decisions and language
of the courts point to this as the true purpose of the rule. 'This
view has the merit of leaving fewer decisions among the "misfits"
than either of the others.
In so abstruse a matter, it will be well first to restate the rule
in terms of these several purposes and to examine the practical
result of the application of these several forms of the rule to the
various classes of cases into Which the' problems fall. The rule
affects only contingent or executory limitations.
I The rule makes void such executory limitations as might
suspend the absolute poswr of alienation lieyond what the law
has fixed as a reasonable period. The absolute power of alienation
is suspended when there are no persons in being by whom an ab.solute fee can be conveyed. It is not suspended when there are
persons in being who can jointly convey an absolute fee in possession. Such limitations as create the former situation are void;
'Lewis, Perpetuities, supp., :6-i9; Marsden, Perpetuities, Chapter
iJ; Gray, Perpetuities, Chapter VII ; Chaplin, Suspension of Power of
Ahenation, 2nd Ed., 177 et seq., Tiffany, Real Property, 2d Ed., 59t.
'Gray, Remoteness of Charitable Gifts, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 4o6.
'See post page 575.
"'Seepost notes 27, 49, 58, 61.
.See Lisle, Remoteness of Charitable Gifts, 8 Har. L Rev. :2;, and
a valuable article by Professor Rundell, The Suspensiun of the Absolute
Power of Alienation, i9 Mich, L. Rev. 235.
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such limitations as creat, the latter situation are not affected by
the rule.
II The rule makes void such executory limitations as might
remain unvested beyond what the law has fixed as a reasonable
period. Such limitations are void whether the power of alienation
is postponed by them or not.
III The rule makes void such executory limitations as suspend the absolute power of alienation of the fee, beyond what the
law has fixed as a reasonable period, by postponing the absolute
ownership of the fee. The absolute power of alienation of the
fee is suspended when there is no present tenant (or co-tenants)
by whom an absolute fee can be conveyed. It is not suspended
when there is a tenant (or co-tenants) in being who can convey
an absolute fee. Nor is it suspended by such executory limitation when an absolute fee could not be conveyed if the executory
limitation did not exist.
Subject to an exception noted later, executory interests which
are indestructible. by the present tenant and which cannot be released, necessarily suspend the power of alienafion of an absolute
fee. Executory interests that can be released do not suspend the
power of alienation by joint action, but do suspend the power of
the present tenants to make an absolute fee. In this respect executory interests may be,divided into four classes.
(1) The limitation may be to a person not in being and who
may not be in being within the period allowed. Such a limitation
is vod under any form of the rule. A devise to the first born
grandchild of A (a bachelor when the limitation is made) might
remain executory and inalienable during the life of A and the
lives of all A's children: The possibility that it might remain
executory avoids the limitation under forms II and III. The possibility that it might remain inalienable avoids it under form I,
Each form treats the possibility of the situation objectionable to
it as cause for rendering the limitation void in its creation,'
(2) The limitatioh may be to u petson to be ascertained out
of an unlimited group who may remain unascertained beyond the
period allowed. This also is void under any form. A devise to
the person -who will be elected president of the United States in
1960 must remain both e.ecntory and inalienable until he is ascertained.'
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(3) The limitation may be to a person to be ascertained out of
a limited group, all of whom are now in being, or will be in being
within the period allowed, but who might not be individually ascertained within that period. This is void tinder forms II and III,
but valid under form L" A devise to the survivor of the children
of A (a bachelor when the limitation is made) might remain contingent during the life of A and the lives of several children. But
the group power of alienation is suspended only during the life
of A., The group of whom the survivor must be one will all be in
being at the death of A, and each can release his possibility, so
that jointly they can release the interest, and in conjunction with
those having present interests in the propert), convey an absolute
fee.
(4) The limitation may be to a person in being and ascertained, but on a condition precedent which may remain eventual
beyond the period allowed. This too is void under forms II and
1II1 but valid under form 112 A devise to the A corporation on
condition precedent that it pay to the B corporation a sum of
money, without limit as to the time of payment, might, if it W¢ere
allowed, remain contingent forever, but the interest of 'the A
corporation can be released at any time.
(5) So far there is no difference in effect between forms II and
11. But they part company when we consider the exception already referred to. Suppose a deAse to corporation A on trust to
use the income for certain charitable purposes, with a devise over
to corporation B also for a charitable purpose if A ever neglects
to carry out the purpose in testator's will." From the nature of
the charitable trust the property would be inalienable by A even if
there were no gift over. There would be a suspension of the
power of alienation by the nature of the present interest. The
executory gift consequently does not make it any more inalienable.
J.Ch. 872, 71 L.
$In re Lord Stratheden, L. R. 118941 3 Ch.45, 63 L..

T.225, 42 W. R. 647.
'Avern v. Lloyd, 0868) L. R.5 Eq. 383, 8 L. T.

489.

28,

37 L.J. Ch.

"li re Hargreaves, Alidgeley v. Tatley. (i8go) L. . 43 Ch. D.4oi,
59 L, J. Ch, 384, 62'L. T. 473. 38 W. R. 470.
London & South Western Ry. Co. v. Gomm, (.882) L. R. 2o Ch.
R6o.
Div. s6a, 51 Li J.Ch. 530, 46 L. T.449, 3o W. R.

-fineral Land Investment Co. Y. Bishop Iron Co., gi6) j34 Minn.
N.W 966.

432, 159

"Christ's Hospital v. Grainger, (1849)
Tw. 533, 19 L. J.Ch. 33, 14 Jur. 339.

1 AlacN.

& G. 46o, 1 Hall &
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The executory gift might fenain contingent forever, but it does
not suspend the power of alienation either by group action, or by
postponing the absolute ownership of the fee. Even if it were required to vest in 1B corporation within the period usuallyallowed,
it would still hbeinalienable by 1B. Assuming the validity of preicit gifts on muchi trusts for charitable purposes, the executory
limitation would be good under forms I and 111 and void under
form IU."
The problem presented by the last three classes of cases nay ble
put in the form of two questions.
1. Does the rule against perpetuities require only a power of
alienation of the fee by joint action of the parties with successive interests, or does it require vesting?
2. Does it require vesting when vesting does not promote any
Iwer of alienation?
The history of the law of real property is full of efforts of
alienors to control the future succession to the property transferred. The common law has persistently defeated these efforts.
The fee simple conditional was an early example. If A gave an
estate to B and the heirs of his body, the manifest intent was thmt
the land remain to B's issue and when the issue failed that it
should return to the donor?' But the couts held that B could
alien the land in fee simple so sootn as is mue was born, and the intent was defeated. The statute De Donis Conditionalibus, 1285,
provided that the will of the donor should b.- observed and took
away 13's power of alienation on birth of issue. The statute assured the succession of the land to B's issue against all the efforts
of B or his creditors. Thut was created the estate tail which was
an unblushing perpetuity in its time. Efforts to repeal the statute
failed," but the courts after two centuries allowed the tenant to
"See Gray, Remoteness of Charitable Gifts,'7 Harv.J. Rev. 412.
"See the preamble to the Statute De Donis, 1285. "In all the cases
after issue begotten and borne between them to whom the lands were
given under such cotdition, heretofore such feoffees had power to aliene
the land so given and to disinherit their issue of the land, contrary to the
minds of the givers, and contrary to the form expressed in tle gift."
"in Sir Anthony tildmay's Case, (1605) 6 Co. 40a, the reporter
states: "And in this case some points on great consideration were resolved....: i. That all these perpetuities were againit the reason and
policy of the common law; for at common law all inheritances were feesimple. . . . But the true policy and rule of the common law in this point
was in effect overthrown by the statute de donis conditionalibus . .. which
established a general perpetuity by act of Parliament for all who had or
effect
would make it, by force whereof all the possessions of England ,in
were entailed accordingly, which was the occasion and cause of the said
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clock the entail by 4 common recovery, and to alien the land in fee
simple."
Donors attempted to prevent recourse to this means of docking the entails by attaching clauses restraining alienation to. the
estates created. The courts called these estates attempted
perpetuities and held the estates good and the restraining clauses
void." The term perpetuity is here applied to a present estate made
inalienable.
Restraints on the alienation -of the fee simple west held void
from an early date." Even restraints on the alienation of life estates or estates for years were held void," although provision could
be made for their forfeiture out of regard for the interest of the
landlord.
Defeated at law donors resorted to equity. But equity was no
more'regardful of donors' wishes. Alienation could no more be
prevented by putting the property in trust for the donee than by a
restraint on the legal title These rules against restraining the
alienation of presently vested estates are everywhere in force and
are known as the rules against restraints on alienation.
Unable to 'control the succession to their gifts by restraining
the alienation of present interests, donors attempted to control it,
by so formulating their gifts that their donees would not have the
ownership to alien, in other words by the creation of future interests therehi,"s
and divers other mischiefs. And the same was attempted and endeavored

to be remedied at divers Parliaments and divers Iills were exhibited ac-

cordingly (which I have seen), but they were always on one pretense or

another rejected, But the truth was, that the Lords. and Commons, knowing that their estates-tail were not to be forfeited by felony or treason

as their estates of inheritance were before the said act, and finding that
they were not answerable for the debts and incumbrances of their ancestors,. nor did the sales, alienations, or leases of their ancestors hind
them for the lands which were entailed to their ancestors, they always rejected' such bills:'
'Taltarum's case, .(472) Y. B. 13 Edw. IV.. 9.

SCorhet's Case, (599) i Co. 831h; Sir Anthony Mihlmay's Case,
(z6os) 6 Co. 4oa; Mary Portington's Case, (613) to Co. 35b. Gray, Perpetuities, sec. 140 et seq.
"Gray, Restraints on Alienation, sec. ig.
'Gray, Restraints on Alienation, see. 134 et seq.
"Gray, Restraints on Alienation, secs.
168,
,
6,
2A6.
Two exceptions were allowed in equity, There could be restraint on alienation of

a married woman's estate during coverture, Gray, Restraint on Alienation,

sees., 125-131k., and in many of the United States there may ha spendthrift trusts which are inalienable, Gray. Restraints on Alienation sec.

177a et seq.
="But the term perpentily and the general principle of law forbidding
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The law had come to allow several forms of future interests.
Vested remainders were first allowed, then contingent remainders,
and after the Statute of Uses, 1535, and Wills, 1540, contingent
remainders by way of use, springing and shifting uses and executory devises.'
The law has never objected to vested remainders. The remaindermen are in being and can alien their interest and there
never has been any objection to the postponement of possession
provided that the remainder was vested in interest, that is provided there was ownership of an estate and not a mere possibility."
Contingent remainders might have been troublesome. They
could be limited to persons not in esse. They might be given to,
each person in succession to whom it' was desired to secure the
property. For example, to A for life, and after to the use of every
person who should be his heir, one after another, for the term of
the life of every such heir oily.!
Alienation of the fee would be impossible because the fee was
not given to anyone, but only life estates. 'But contingent remainders were kept with!, bounds by a rule much older than the rule
against perpetuities. This rule was that after a life estate to .a
person not in being, a remainder limited to that person's issue
was void." Whatever the reason for this rule its effect Was, by
the creation of a perpetuity are first met with, after it had become well
settled that an estate tail might be barred by a common recovery, amongst
the reasons given for deciding that any contrivance to restrain a tenant
in tail from suffering a recover shall be of no effect. When the law
came to recognize as valid the limitation of estates in remainder to unborn children, and further to admit the creation of future estates by way
of shifting use and executory devise, it was seen that such devices, unless restrained within due bounds, might pave the way to perpetual settlement of land; and the same principle of policy was again invoked."
Williams, Real Property, 23d Ed. 439.
"For the history of the development of the various classes of future
interests see Fraser, Future Interests in Property, 4 MINNmoTA LAW
REvIEw 307.

"Gray, Perpetuitics, sec. Mo.
"See eases discussed in Chfidleigh's Case, (1595) i C, . n2oa, 138,
Perrot's Case, ('J94) Moore 368, 372; Manning & Andrew's Case, (;576)
x Leon, 254 258, Gray, Perpetuities, sec. 937 note 2; Williams, Real Property, 23d Ed., 445 note.
In England after a life estate in real property to an unborn person
there cannot be a remainder to that persons issue even if the remainder
is.Mitchell,
so limited
as not
to offend
against
v.
(t89o)
4 Clh.
D. 85, 59theL.rule
J. Chi.
485, 6aperpetuities.
L. T'. Rep, Whitby
N. S. 77!,
a8
x Ch,Settlement,
zj7 L, J, (3914]1
Ch. 4r,iCh.
o: L.595,
T.
837,Wkly.
5 .Rep.
J 48, 337;
26 T'.InL.ReR. Nash,
57T; In[igiol
Re Parks
83 1 3. Ch. 528, 110 L. T. 813, 58 S. J. t.
This rule is older than the
rule against perpetuities. WVilliams, Real Property, Sed Ed. 5; Pttcher,
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restricting the number of contingent remainders, to ensure an
earlier vesting of the fee in one who would have power to alien it.
The wings of contingent remainders were further clipped by
the requirements of seisin. The remainders failed unless they
were vested before, or at the moment when the prior estate of
freehold ended. And as the present tenant for life could put an
end to his estate by a tortious alienation or by merger, it was
Within his power to destroy the contingent remainders at any
time.
. After the Statute of Uses, alienors attempted to accomplish
the same object by limiting remainders by way of use. It was
argued that the seisin for the use was in the fcoffee to the use and
the contingent interest limited was therefore not dependent upon
the seisin of the present tenant and consequently he could not
destroy the contingent interest by destruction of his own estate.
The argument was logically sound, but it did not prevail. Contingent remainders by way of use were held equally destructible
with those of the common law. 2' Neither could be used to control
the devolution of the property into the remote future, or to~prevent the alienation of the fee by the present tenant.
Contingent and Executory Interest In Land 8f. Although its iarlier existence has been doubted. In Re Ashforth, f19o51 Ch. 535, 74 L. J.Ch.
361, 92 L. T.J,4, 21 T. L. R.329, 53 Wkly. Rep. 328; Gray, Perpetuities,

3d Ed. sec. 201.
""As is stated in Mr. Butler's note to Coke on Littleton, 342 b. L.,
although the suspense or abeyance of the inheritance (as distinguished
from the freehold) was allowed by the common law, it was discountenanced and discouraged as much as possible and modern law has added her

discouragement of every contrivance which tends to render property inalienable beyond the limits settled for its suspense, because it is clear
that no restraint on alienation would bq more effectual than a suspense
of the inheritance. He adds: 'The same principles have, in some degree, given rise to the well-known rule of law, that a preceding estate
of freehold is indispensably, necessary for the support of a contingent remainder; and they influence, in .some degree, the doctrines respecting the
destruction of contingent remainders.'" Per Farwell, J.in In Re Ashforth, L. R,ligos] z Ch. 535, 74 L. J; Ch. 36t, 92 L. T. 534, a1 T. L. R.
329,5 35W. R. 328.
6""The 'sacred rule' enunciated in Purefoy v. Rogers, (669) a Wins.
Saund. 768, 68, n. 9, that no limitation shall be construed as an executory or shifting use which can by possibility take effect by way of remainder

. . .

probably owes its origin to the chance of destruction by the

failure of the particular estate incident to the one and not to the other,"
. . . In Chudleigh's Case. (z89-95) z Rep. u.oa (the case of perpetuities), the court defeated an attempt to male the Statute of Uses serve as
a means of protecting contingent remainders from destruction, lest lands
should remain too long in settlement." Per Farwell, J.in In Re Ashforth,
L. R. [i9o5] i Ch. 535, 544, 74 L. J.Ch. 36t, 92 L. T. 534, 21 T. L. R. 3*9,
53 W. R.328.
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Tile arguments that failed to save contingent remainders
created by way of use, prevailed with respect to the new future
interests that could not be classified as contingent remainders-springing and shifting uses and executory devises. They were
held indestructible by any act of the present tenant." They too

could he limited to persons not in esse. A slight change in the
wording of the limitations would prevent the interests being classified as contingent remainders, and would require that they be
classified as executory uses or devises.
Reverting to the example previously given it was only necessary in a will to say, to A for life, and one day after his death to
the use of every other person who should be his heir, one after
another, each person to take one day after tie death of his predecessor, for the term of the life of every such heir only. These
life interests could not he classified as remainders, since they werenot limited to legin immediately on the termination of tle preceding estates. They were executory devises and indestructible.
In this way it would have been possible for alienors to control the
succession to the property and to render the fee inalienable, into
the remote future, had not some check been put on the creation oi
these inferests. To such interests, indestructible by the present
tenant, as might continue farther into the future than the policy of
the law could allow, the term perpetuity was applied, and the rule
against perpetuities was developed to keel) them within bounds.
The old rules against restraiits on the pover of alienation had
been concerned with restraints on the present interests. These restraints were express and collateral to the interests given and the
law could accomplish its object by holding the restraint void and the
interests good. But when the device of future interests was used.
the suspension of the power of alienation by a present tenant arose
out of the very existence of the future interests. The only way
to remove the suspension and to restore the power was to hold the
future interests themselves void, And this the rule against perpetuities does.

,Another imlortant difference developed between the rules
.against restraints on the power of alienation and the new rule
against perpetuities. Since the express restraints on present interests could be destroyed without affecting the interests no period
of grace was allowed them, A restraint on the alienation of a
iPK v. Brown, (z6-o) Cro. Jac. ago; Gray, Perpetuities, secs. 142"

et seq.
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present alsolute fee for a life in being or for five years is void."

The restraint is at once and altogether bad. But when the suspension
is by force of a future interest tile interest itself must be destroyed
to end the suspension. Now future interests have their legitimate
uses. It is not tile use hut tle abuse of the scheme of future interests that calls for condemnation. Suspension of the power of
alienation should be' endured long enough to enable the scheme of
future interests to he used for beneficent purposes but not so long
as to make them the recourse of the whimsical and capricious. It is a
balancing of interests, the public interest in having property alienable against the public and private interest in allowing testators
to make reasonable dispositions of their property and provision for
dependents, As the period of suspension is extended the former
interest grows weightier and the latter lighter. The period permissible was finally fixed at twenty-one years after the termination of lives in being, at the creation of the interests.'t There can
consequently be a" suspension of the power of alienation of the absolute fee by a present tenant for this period
because of the limitation of future interests thereon, although
there cannot lie anj restraint at all on alienation of a present absolute fee.
The rule against perpetuities was a special rule developed to
take care of suspensions caused by future interests and has no
application to other restraints, express or implied, on present interests,
The above historical retrospect shows that in some cases the
object and in all cases the result of the rules allowing docking of
entails, against restraints on alienation, and maintaining the destructibility of contingent remainders, was to secure a power of
alienation of the fee to a' present tenant. It was an infraction of
"Morse v. Blood, (897) 68 Minn.442, 7 NW.682; Hausev. O'Leary,
(x917)
i6t N. W. 392.
I "By z36
the Minn.
device Ab,
of trustees

to support contingent remainters property
could lie made practically inalienable at common law for lives in being
and twenty-one years. It was on analogy' to this that the period of the
rule against perpetuities was fixed.' "The rules respecting executurj" devises have conformed to the rules laid down inthe construction of legal
limitations, and the courts have said that the estate shall not be malienable by executory devises for a longer time than is allowed by the
limitations of a common law conveyance. In marriage settlements the
estate may be limited to the first and other sons of the marriage in tail,
and until the person to whom the last remainder is limited is of age the
estate is 'unahenable. In conformity to that rule the courts have said
so far we will allow executory devises to be good." Per Lord Kenyon,
C. .1,, in Long v. lBlackall, 0797) 7 Durn. &E. zoo.
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this policy to hold that the new springing and shifting uses and executory devises were indestructible by the present tenant." But having held them indestructible the courts set about to limit the mischief
such'interests might cause. So long as indestructible interests remained executory there could not be a present tenant with power
to convey an absolute fee. The courts restricted the period for
which they could be created to continue executory and held all
that might continue executory beyond that period void. The
period finally adopted was lives in being at the creation of the interest and twenty-one years thereafter. By allowing interests to
remain executory during this period the ownership of the absolute
fee could be postponed, and there would not be, during this period,
a present tenant with power to alien an absolute fee. But on the
other hand by restricting the period for which they could- be
limited to remain executory it was insured that there would again
be, when the period had expired, a tenant entitled to an absolute
fee with power to alien the same. So the rule against perpetuities
took the form of a rule against remoteness in vesting, but itS object was to prevent an unreasonable postponement of the power of
alienation by a present tenant entitled to the fee. And where that
object is not served the rule should not apply.
In most of the cases in which the rule against perpetuities was
developed the future interests were both contingent and unreleasable and so were void under any form of the rule. But there weri
early some cases in which contitigent interests kould be released
which, nevertheless, were held void without referring to this fact.
In the first great case on the rule, the Duke of Norfolk's
case" a term for 200 years was limited to H, but if T die without
issue in the lifetime of H, then it should go to C. The validity of
the limitation to C was questioned. H and C were both lives in
being at the time the limitations were made. C could have released
his interest at ny time." The term was consequently alienable by
"The notion that an executory devise was not barred by a recovery
'went down with'the judges like chopped hay.' Per Powell, 3., Scattergood v. Edge, (1699) 12 Mod. 28, 281. 'These executory devises had
not been long countenanced when the judges repented them; ad if it
were to be done again, it would never prevail.' Per Treby, C. J., ld 287."
GraX, Perpetuities, sec. 159 n. 3.
(082) 3 Cl. Cas.i.
."a Preston, Abstracts, 283; Lampet's Case, (:6z3) zo Co. 46b; Tiffany,
Real Property,

2d

Ed, 589,
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H and C joining. The case was in equity before Lord Chancellor
Nottinglam. He was assisted by Chief Justice Pemberton, Chief
justice North, and Chief Baron Montague. The three justices
delivered opinions agreeing that the limitation to C was void.
North and Montague said it was void because it would create a perpetuity. Pemberton was more definite. He said it was void because H could not alien the property. There is not a suggestion
in the opinions that the power of release of the executory interest
of C would save the limitation. The Lord Chancellor held that the
limitation to C was good; He said:"
"If it tends to a perpetuity, there needs no more to be said, for
the law has so long labored against perpetuities, that it is an undeniable reason against any settlement, if it can be found to tend
to a perpetuity.
"A perpetuity is the settlement of an estate or an interest in
tail, with such remainders expectait upon it, as are in no sort in
the power of the tenant in tail in possession, to dock by any recov-'
cry or assignmient, but such remainders must continue as perpetual
clogs upon the estate; such do fight against God, for they pretend
to such a stability in human affairs, as the nature of them Admits
not of, and they are against the reason and policy of the law and
therefore not to be endured.
"But on the other side, future interests, springing trusts, or
trusts executory, remainders that are to emerge and arise upon
contingencies, are quite out of the rules and reasons of perpetuities,
nay, out of the reason upon which the policy of the law is fotmded
in those cases, especially, if they be not of remnotp or long consideration; but such as by a natural and easy interpretation i4U
speedily wear out, and so things conie to their right channel again."
The decision was rested on the ground that where it is within
the compass of one life that a contingency is to happen, there is no
danger of a perpetuity. Such limitations "produce no inconvenience. They wear out in a little time." The Lord Chancellor
added:
"They will perhaps say, where will you stop . . . ?
"Where? Why everywhere, where there is not any inconvenience, any danger of-a perpetuity; and whenever you stop at the
limitation' of a fee upon a fee, there we will stop in the limitation of
a term of years. No man ever yet said, a devise to a man and his
heirs, and if he die without issue, living B. then to B. is a naughty
remainder, that is Pell's and Brown's Case.
"Now the ultimum quod sit, or the utmost limitation of a fee
upon a fee, is not yet plainly determined, but it will be soon found
17, 2M, 24.
3 Ch. Cas.
'0682)
in the1,original.
*Not italicized
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outt, if men shall set their wits ol work to contrive by contingencies, to do that which tile law has so long labored against, tile
thing will make itself evident, where it is inconvenient, and God
forbid, but that mischief should be obviated and prevented."
There was another limitation over to E,a person in being, on
the event that the issue of C ever, failed. That too would he releasable. But the Lord Chancellor and judges agreed that this
limitation was void."
Child v. Baylic9 and Grey v. Montague" were similar cases
in which the future interests were held void without adverting to
the fact that they were to lwrsuas in being who could release them,
aiid that the property was consequently alienable by the joint action of the parties with interests.
The first cases in which the courts referred to the effect of a
power of release on the validity of a future interest were Gilbertson v. Richards, Birnujughaun Canal Co. v. Cart uright' and
Averi. v. Lloyd." In all three cases it was held that remoteness in
vesting was unobjectionable provided that the power of alienation
lby joint action was not unduly suspended. "It seems obious,"
said the court in Avern v. Lloyd, "that such a case is not within
the principle on which the law against perpetuity rests and that
the limitation in question of the absolute interest does not fail as
being too remote."
But these decisions did not prevail. Gilbert v. Richardson was
lint on other grounds by the Court of Exchequer Chamher.1
Birmingoha Canal Co. z#. Caritrightwas overruled in London &
S. W. R.Co. v.Gothm"' and Avern v. Lloyd was overruled in In Re
Hargreavles." It is now firmly established that the common law
rule is not satisfied by a power of alienation by joint action of the
parties with successive interests in the property. And in its present
form it is true to its original purpose.'
The effect of the rule in operation fortifies authority. The
t
(1682) 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 48.
P'(x6.8) Cro. )ac. 458 4$9.
17641) Eden 2o5, 3 Brown P. C 314.
"(1859) 4 H. & N. 277, 28 L. J. Ex. If.
"(879)L. R. i Ch.D. 421, 48 L J. di. 552, 40 L. T. 784, e7 W. R.
597."2(1868) L. R.s Eq. 383, 37
L. J.Ch.48% 18 L. T. 282, 16 W. R.6.
"(86o) S H. & N. 453, 29 L. J. E. 213, 6 Jur. N. S. 672.
"(188)L. R. = Ch. 1. 562, Si L. J. Ch. 530, 46 L. T. 449, 30 V; R.
4

) 43 Ch. D.401, 59 L. J.Ch.384, 62 L. T.473, 38 NV. R. 470,
Njo
"Gray, Perpetuities, Ch. VII.
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difference in the effect of the two forms is well illustrated by options to buy land. These options are specifically enforceable in
equity. Consequently they are in effect executory eq,'!tble limitations of the property."' A devise to A and his heirs but if B or
his heirs ever pay a sum of money to A or his heirs, then the
property to go over to B and his heirs would have the same effect.
The executory limitation is void.' But as it could be released, it
would be good if the rule required only a power of alienation by
joint action of A and B."
If land be limited to A and his heirs and if A's issue ever fails
to B and his heirs, the limitation to B is void. It would be good if
the rule were only against a suspension of the power of alienation
by joint action ofA and B. This power of alienation is not suspended even for a day. Estates tail have been generally abolished,
but some of their objeitinable features reappear in a limitation
of this kind,
The rule against perpetuities is a practical rule." Itdoes not
look so much at the theoretical possibility of a joint conveyance
as it the practical improbability of it. It would be 'difficult
to agree on the value of' the executory interest. The dif"Now is there any substantial distinction between a"contract for purchase, or an option for purchase, and a conditional limitation? Is there
any difference in substance between the case of a limitation to A. in fee,
with a proviso that whenever a notice in writing is sent and Lioo paid
by B.or his heirs to A.or his heir, the estate shall vest in B.and his
heirs, and a contract that whenever such notice is given and such paymant made by B. or his heirs to A. or his heirs, A; shall convey to B. and
his heirs? It seems to me that in a court of equity it is impossible to suggest that there is any real distinction between these two cases. There is
in each case the same fetter on the estate and on the oivners of the estate for all time, and It seems to me to be plain that the rules as to remoteness appl to one case as much as to the other," Per Jessel, M. It,
in London &S. W. Ry.Co. v. Gomn, (x882) L A. 2o Ch. D. 562 51 L.
j; Ch5u3ch 46 L. T. 449,3o W. R. 6o.
"Suc options are valid under the Minnesota statutory rule. Mineral
Land Investment Co. v. Bisho9 Iron Co., (igi6) 134 Minu.412, x59 N. W.
6"If the owner in fee of an estate, or the absolute owner of any prop-

erty could be fettered from disposing of it by a springing use or executory devise or future contingent interest which might not arise till after
the period allowed by the rule, it would be easy to tie up. property for a
very long time indeed. The present interest under the executory limita-'
tions might be vested in an infant a lunatic, or in a person who would
refuse to release It, and thus the estate would be practically inalienable
for a period long beyond the prescribed limit. That is clearly not the
law." Per Kay, J., in London & S. W. By. Co. v Gomm, (iS8a) L. R.
2oCh. D. 6,sz L.J. Ch.jo, 46L.T.449,3oW.R.62o. And see Gray,
Perpetuities, sees. 268 et seq.: Rundell, The Suspension of The Absolute

TPower of Alienation, ug Mich. L. R. 242.
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ficulty of getting life tenants and remaindermen to unite
in a conveyance is well known. There is greater difficulty here.
The contingencies on which executory limitations may be made
operative are without number. There is nothing to correspond to
actuarial tables of mortality as in the case of life interests. The
executory devisee can-use his comparatively valueless interest as a
club over the present tenant. True the fee may be aliened without a release but it would continue subject in the bands of the
alienee to the executory interest. This interest is indestructible
by any act on A's part. Purchasers cantiot he found for such iefective titles.
Professor Reeves, who has made the best argument for the
other form of the rule," answers this objection as followVs:
"The Anglo-Saxon policy as to values has generally been to
let them regulate and care for themselves. Otherwise, there
would doubtless have been numerois rules for compelling alienation by co-tenants, for example, in many cases of which the price
of the interests of some of the owners may be as injuriously affected by the refusal of the others to sell or release, as if the latter
were contingent remaindermen.""
Co-tenancy serves a useful purpose. One tenant's right to
say whether the property should be sold or held is as good as his
co-tenant's. There is'no difficulty in determining the value of
concurrent interests. And co-tenants can generally have partition.
But remote future interests are not of such use that the inconveniences arising from them should be endured.
How the law looks at the practical results is well shown by In
Re Rosher," a case of express restraint on the alienation of a present interest. A devised real estate to his son and his heirs with
the proviso that if he should desire to sell the property, in the lifetime of devisor's widow, she should have the option to purchase
the same for £3000. The value was £15000. Theoretically the
land was not inalienable. But the condition was held void as a
restraint on alienation. The court said that "to compel him, if lie
does sell, to sell at one-fifth of the value, and to throw away fourfifths of the value of the estate is equivalent to a restraint uponl
selling at all." "
"Gray, Perpetuities, ur. 278a&.
"Reeves, Real Property 1265.
"(1884) L. R. 2-6 Ch. D; 8oz,

53 L. J. Ch.

722, 51 L. T. 785, 32

W. R.

"For similar reasoning see Morse v. Blood, (1897) 68 Minn. 442, 71,
N. W. 682.,
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Turning more particularly to the second question, does the rule
require vesting when vesting does not promote any power of
alienation?
It has already been shown how the courts have historically defeated restraints on the alienation of present interests, and how
donors resorted to the'device of giving only limited present interersts and future interests thus postponing ownership of the fee in
order to control the devolution of the property into the future.
Certain classes of these interests were finally held indestructible
by,the present tenant and the courts were compelled to set a bound
to them in order to carry out the ancient policy of the law. That
bound was the rule against perpetuities. It took the form of a
rule against remoteness in vesting, but its object was to insure that
there will again be when the period has run, a tenant with power
to alien.
There are two classes of cases in which this object would not
be promoted by holding the future interest void. 1. When the
future interest is lestructible by the present tenant. 2. When
the present interest would be inalienable even if the future interest limited thereon were held void.
Future interests upon an estate tail or after an estate tail are
destructible by the tenant in tail. If they are so limited that they
cannot persist after the estate tail has come to-an end, they are not
affected by the rule against perpetuities. If they are so limited
that they might persist after the estate tail has terminated they
are subject to the rule.' To give this statement another form:
If there will always be a tenant with power to alien the fee the
future interests are not void no matter how remotely they might
vest; if there might come to bc a tenant without power to alien
the fee because of the future interests, they are void if too remote.
Present charitable trusts are inalienable from their nature."
They may be created to last forever. The law favors them and
sanctions a perpetuity where it is for a charitable purpose.
"Gray, Perptuities, Ch. XIV.
'It is often said that trusts for charity are unalienable because there
are no definite cestuis que trust and there is consequently no one to alien

them. "No one has any alienable rights because no one has any rights."
Gray, Perpetuities sec. 59o. But is this the true reason? The trustee has
the legal title and if no one else has any rights, he must also have the
equitable title. Why can' the trustee not alien? Are they not inalienable
because the law recognizes the interest of the indefinite group and makes
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Suppose the gift is to A corporation on a charitable trust with
an execiltory gift on a remote contingency over to B corporation
also on a charitable trust. This was the case in Christ's Hospital
v. Graingerr" The gift over was held good. The court said:
"It was then argued that it was void as contrary to the rules
against
perpetuities,
These from
rules being
are toinalienable
prevent, in
the cases
to
apply, property
beyond
certain
which they
Is this
are these
rules
periods.
the transfer,
in a effect
certainproduced,
event, ofand
property
from
oneinvaded
charity by
to
another? i the corporation of Reading might hold the property
for certain charities in Reading, why may not the corpration of
London hold it for the charity of Christ's Hospital in London?
The property is neither more nor less alienable on that account."
Of this case Gray says?'"
"But here, with submission to so great an authority, is the
common confusion betwe'n perpetuity in the sense of inalienability and perpetuity in the sense of remoteness. Property dedicated
to a charity is inalienable necessarily; but to allow a gift to charity
to commence in a remote future is not necessary; and the object
of the rule against perpetuities is to restrain the creation of future
conditional interests.
"If a remote gift to a charity after a gift to another charity is
good, because it is by nature inalienable, then a gift to a charity
after a gift to an individual should be good; the individual can
alienate the whole of his present interest, and the remote intercat is no more and no less inalienable than when limited after a gift
to another charity. Yet after a gift to an individual a gift to a
charity may be unquestionably bad for remoteness. So a remote
gift to a charity without any preceding gift at all is too remote."
This case and Gray's comment raises the question whether
Gray's insistence that the rule is against remoteness investing is
,quite' justifiable. The language of the cases is that it is a rule
against suspension of the power of alienation." Gray fought valiantly and rightly against the idea that alienability by joint conveyit the duty of the trustee to hold the property and devote it to charitable

pureose?
I
(1847) j6 Sire. 8&j, McN. & G. 460, z U. & Tw. S.
"Perpetuities, sees. 6oo, 60. See also Remoteness of Charitable Gifts,
7 Harv. Law Rev. 4T2.
38% extending the period of the rule to include an infancy after a life
in being, the judges of the King's Bench gave as a rhason that "the power
of alienation will not be restrained longer than the law would restrain
it, viz. during the infancy of' the first taker, which cannot reasonably be
said to extend to a perpetuity:' Stevens v. Stevens, (1736) Cas. Temp.
Talb. 22&
"The question always is, whether there is a rule of law, fixing a periol,
during which property may be unalienable. The lanuage of all these
cases is, that property may be so limited as to make it unalienable dur-
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ance satisfied the rule. But did he not lean too far to the other
side? In the second and third editions of his Rule Against Perpetuities lie expressed some doubt of the "entire correctness" of his
criticism quoted above. He states the doctrine to be that "future
interests must arise within a certain time," but that when the law
allows property to be taken out of commerce as in the case of
charities there seems to be no occasion to apply the rule. But does
net the rule itself need restatement to accord with the language of
the cases and with Christ's Hospitol v. Grainger and the cases

that follow it ?
If property is given to an individual and then on a remote contingency over to a charity, the reason for holding 'the gift over
void is obvious. The present tenant would have a power to alien
but for the charitable gift, and the charitable gift is illusory.' The
public policy that overlooks inalienability' in present charities
would be going far to sanction inalienability in individuals for the
remote possibility to the charity. And the same reasoning applies to a remote gift to a charity without any preceding gift at all.
Some one has the right to the property subject to the executory
gift to the charity and cannot alien it because of that gift.
The common law rule against perpetuities is a: logical development from the policy of the law to keep property alienable. The
law has generally insisted on a power of alienation by an individual tenant. Indestructible executory interests necessarily suspend
that power pro tanto. The only way to end the suspension is to
get rid of the executory interest, It may be got out of the way
ing a number of lives not exceeding that, to which testimony can be applied, to determine, when the survivor of them drops." Per Eldon, Lord
Chancellor, in Thellusson v. Woodford, (:8os) ii Ves. 112.
"Upon the introduction of executory devises and the indulgence
thereby allowed to testators, care was taken that the propeny which was
the subject of them should not be tied up beyond a reasonable time, and
'that too great a restraint upon alienation should not be permitted." Per
Baron Bayley, in Cadell v. Palmer, (1833) x Clark & F. 372.
"The rule against perpetuities is that you shall not make property
absolutely unalienable beyond a certain period, It is only a rule in favor
of alienation." Per Jessel, M. R, In Re Ridley, (i87) LR. ii Ch, Div,
$4%Storrs
Agricultural School v. Whitney, 0887) 54 Conn. 342, 8 AtL.
MttacKenzie v. Trustees, (x9o5) 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 6z At. oinT; Gray,
Peretuities, see. 597.
Although the interest of the charity is created by the contract, it
does not become effective until the happening of a future event, and it Is
ht very postponement of its effectiveness which renders It obnoxious to
the rule against perpetuities." Per Warrington, J, in Worthing Corporation v. Heather, I 9o6j 2 Ch. M2, 7S L. J. Ch. 761.
141;
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by vesting or by avoidance. If it vests there will be a new tenant
with power to alien; if it is avoided the old tenant will have the
power. In either case there will be a tenant with power to alien
the fee. Some suspension must be endured out of respect tO the
legitimate uses of executory interests. The period allowed is
fixed by the rule. If the interests are such that they cannot remain executory longer they are good, alienability will be restoreJ
by vesting. If the interests might remain executory longer, and
thereby the power of alienation is suspended longer, they are void,
and the power of alienation of the prior tenant is unrestrainedV But if avoiding the executory interest would upt promote
the power of alienation the rule has no application.
The rule against perpetuities might be stated thus: An executory limitation of property which causes suspension of power in
the persons having the property subject to it to convey an absolute
fee and which might remain executory for more than twenty-one
years after the termination of lives in being at its creation is void.
'"The mere fact that a contingent interest may be released by persons in being, and that a good title may thus be made, is not enough to
take the case out of the rule, if the estate cannot be alienated by those
having vested interests in it, because a possible future interest is created
which may not vest within the time fixed by law." Windsor v. Mills,
(w89p) x57 Mass. 362, 365, 3606, 3 N. E. 352. See also quotation from
Kay, J., in note 49.

